Turkey, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, and Strategic Thinking

Apologies for my absence, I have been at back-to-back conferences about Syria and now about tactical nuclear weapons.  I presented my thoughts about Turkish nuclear decision-making about tactical nuclear weapons and missile defense.

I have posted my presentation below (please keep in mind the notes are a rough outline and I like to speak from bullet points)

Presentation:

• I want to thank the organizers for putting this conference together – I also greatly appreciate the opportunity to be on a panel with such distinguished experts
• I have been asked to talk about Turkey’s approach to nonstrategic nuclear weapons and missile defense
• I do think that Turkey is a useful model with which to view some of the difficulties the Allies would face to come to a consensus on nuclear reductions
• I will start with the nuclear weapons issues and then address missile defense later on in my presentation
• In short, Turkey values nuclear weapons for deterrence, believes they constrained Russian expansionism during the Cold War, and now believes that they help deter states in the Middle East. They are also an important symbol for a state perpetually wary of relying on verbal guarantees from its security guarantor – the US
• Like with other countries, Turkey’s nuclear narrative is shaped by its experiences during the Cold War
• Turkey is unique from the other NATO countries – it sits at the intersection of East and West and connects the Alliance to the Middle East
• In the past, Turkey’s proximity to the Middle East was quite problematic for NATO, but is now – increasingly – looked at as an asset by the US and the UK – and to a lesser extent, other European allies to project soft and hard power in the Middle East
• In 1957, the first American tactical nuclear weapons were deployed at air bases in Turkey – the deployment was apolitical, the population did not really know that the weapons were there – and this dynamic continues today
• And then, on 16 September 1959, the US and Turkey agreed to deploy the Jupiter missiles to Turkey
• Ankara was eager to have some control over the missiles – arguing that it had to have some say over NATO basing agreements and over its own security
• This theme is particularly important when understanding Turkish strategic thinking – they are happy to rely on the US – albeit very quietly – but want concrete agreements governing the use of NATO/American weapons for Turkish defense
• Thus, they need something physical to demonstrate US seriousness, rather than pieces of paper and statements
• We see this same dynamic in the Missile Defense debate as well, but I will come to that in a moment
• As we all know, the ballistic missiles were traded in 1962, and they were removed by mid-April 1963
• Here we come to a VERY – and I want to stress VERY – important number of inter related factors that continue to influence Turkish strategic thinking
• In parallel to the trading of the missiles – which was not popular in Ankara – the US, in 1964, sent a letter to the Turkish leadership warning them that they could not use US weapons for its planned intervention in Cyprus
• The US expressed fears that the intervention could trigger Russian involvement in the conflict – in turn, this reaffirmed the suspicions in Ankara about the US being willing to trade Ankara for Washington
• Again, we also have to take into account the history of nuclear planning, and the moves in the 1960s towards counterforce – a strategy turkey viewed with suspicion
• These frictions with the US over Cyprus happened again in 1974, when Turkey did invade Cyprus – in response, the US congress imposed an arms embargo and Turkey, retaliated by refusing to continue to allow U-2 flights over the Soviet Union from NATO air bases on its territory
• But, as is always the case w/ Turkish – US relations, the two sides continued to cooperate and eventually patched things up
• Turkish – US relations are a bit like a roller coaster – we have our ups and down – usually about once a decade – The Turks, however, rarely forget the downs and the Americans like to focus on the ups
• The dynamic changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union – Turkey, which up until that time was NATO’s buffer on the southern flank – suddenly was faced with a future of questionable strategic worth to the United States
• And then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and solved Turkey’s geo-strategic problem. Turkish President Ozal jumped at the chance to support the invasion , even though it harmed the Turkish economy greatly – arguing that Turkey could serve as a model for the Middle East and thereby carve out a new role with the United States.
• This same debate took place in 2003 – but the then inexperienced Prime Minister Erdogan failed to rally his party to support the invasion. He did! That turned out to be one of the luckiest no votes in his career.
• They repeated this same model mantra in the mid-1990s in the Turkic states – neither was successful, but it shows how both the US/West and Turkey use the Turkish model talk when it suits their interests – Turkey and the US are sincere when they talk of the Turkish model, but, perhaps, a bit overly ambitious in their messaging
• Turkey was surprised in the aftermath of Gulf War I – like we all were – about the scale and scope of Saddam’s WMD programs
• Turkey then crafted its response to proliferation in the region – I have summarized them in three points:
• First – advocate for nonproliferation – has since joined every major arms control/nonproliferation agreement and the Additional Protocol
• Second – professionalize the armed forces – and beginning in 1996, cooperation first with Israel, and then later with the US, on missile defense – the BMD program has not gone anywhere, due in large part to Turkish procurement policies – if you want I can address this in the question and answer period
• This process is ongoing, but is happening slowly, mainly due to bureaucratic issues dealing with conscription – which has to do with Turkey’s secular/Islam divide – and an aggressive arms procurement policy based on offsets
• Third - continued reliance on NATO nuclear weapons and more broadly – the Alliance’s security guarantee
• Ankara’s nuclear policy in the post cold war era can be summarized as nonproliferation – not disarmament – and Turkey is not eager to give up the weapons deployed, arguing that they are useful for deterrence and that NATO should not unilaterally disarm
• However, we saw a noticeable drop in Turkish nuclear readiness – for example, there are conflicting reports about whether or not Turkish F-16s can carry nuclear weapons – In all honesty, it does not really mater if they can or cant – the weapons cant be used quickly and, in the extremely unlikely scenario that these weapons would be used – the US would move assets into place – Turkish planes would likely serve as escort fighters
• But if anyone can come up with a scenario for the use of weapons in Turkey, I would be interested to hear it . . . I have thought about this, and cant really come up with a scenario where they would be used.
• So how do we move the Turks?
• Any solution would have to be part of larger system to ensure burden sharing and protection from WMD threats in the region. Thus, there have been a number of proposal to swap out nuclear weapons for missile defense or other PGMs.
• As I said, they are interested in missile defense – but only on their terms – which included a dogged pursuit of not just Patriot missile batteries – but the technology that makes them work. In an ideal world, they want a similar agreement to the one struck for the British anti-aircraft missile system Rapier – that agreement allows for co-production in Turkey.
• Turkey does have a tender for up to 4 long-range-air-defense systems, but they postponed it indefinelty in January 2013, saying that they will talk to the four potential suppliers – US, China, Russia, and a French/Italy consortium – about a co-production deal
• The idea is to get access to the technology and co-produce the systems in Turkey so that its defense industry can be built up
• This has been Turkish policy since 1986
• This moved in parallel to the deployment of US, Dutch, and German Patriot batteries in southern Turkey in response to the Syrian crisis – the issues are separate, but the political process is illustrative of Turkish thinking.
• Specifically, it underscores Turkey’s willingness to rely on NATO for its security, as well as its pursuit of its own national policy of offsets – however, like in the nuclear debate, Ankara wants firm guarantees for its security
• It also shows just how misunderstood Turkey was when it described its approach to BMD during the negotiations for the 2010 Strategic Concept
• Turkey was widely thought of as against BMD because of the talk that the system is designed to counter Iranian missiles
• Ankara – which at the time had recently negotiated the failed TRR swap deal – WAS eager to remove proposed language saying that Iran was an enemy of NATO
• However, it was not against missile defense – its demands in that regard were similar to the Jupiter deal in 1959 – they wanted some operation control and wanted a guarantee that they would be used to protect Turkey if attacked by a state in the region – i.e. – Iran
• I don’t have the time, but I can discuss Turkey’s approach to the Iranian nuclear program in the Q and A, if of interest
• As a further example, Turkey recently established a space command and has very ambitious plans to launch 17 satellites, some of which will be early warning, and will be linked to the not yet built “Turkish” missile defense system – this is grandiose rhetoric for public consumption, but, nevertheless, it shows that there are plans being made
• So in one sentence, turkey supports missile defense, but not the naming of specific threats to the Alliance. The issues are separate, but also show the difference between countries about how best to deal with the Iran file
• So to wrap up, if I had to summarize Turkey’s approach to NATO nuclear weapons, I would paraphrase the 2010 Strategic Concept – “committed to a nuclear weapons free world, but will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.” If I could be more blunt, Turks like disarmament, but don’t think that it will happen any time soon – so they might as well hold on to the weapons because they are an important symbol of US guarantees and, oh by the way, they could be used to deter Iran
• Thus, as for removing the weapons, Turks will tell you that they support the idea in principle, but only if it is agreed to by all NATO states – as well all know, this is a diplomatic dodge and a way for Turkey to hide behind the Baltic States and not reveal publicly just how happy Ankara is to keep the status quo
• This underscores the necessity of US movement on the issue – Turkey will not be the country to push for the removal – they will react, but only if consensus is reached
• For missile defense, Turkey is eager, but only on its own terms for an independent capability, which means that they are happy with the NATO system, so long as they get that guarantee that they will cover all of Turkish territory and that Turkey will not be sacrificed is included in the language
• Thus, you can see the debates aren’t all that new – even though the potential adversaries are.

Thank you

More Musings about Sinop: What We Know and Unanswered Questions (UPDATE)

Below please find my analysis of the day’s Sinop related announcements. I have laid them out in bullet points:

• Taner Yildiz told reporters that the guaranteed cost per-kilowatt-hour for the Sinop site will be $11.8 US cents per hour. The Russian Akkuyu consortium agreed to $12.35 cents per hour.
• For reference, Turkey has agreed to buy 70% of the output of reactors one and two at 12.35 US cents per- kWh for 15 years, or until 2030. Ankara has also agreed to purchase 30 percent of the electricity produced at the same price over 15 years from reactors three and four. Rosatom expects to recoup its investment in 15 years and will then begin to pay 20 percent of the company’s profit on annual basis to the Turkish government.
• Japan will reportedly provide 70% of the financing and the other 30% will come from Turkey, which means that EUAS will be investing a substantial amount in the program.
• The Mitsubishi-Itochu-GDF Suez consortium formally submitted a bid for the tender on 5 March 2013. Three days after the consortium’s initial bid, Turkish officials were quoted as saying that it was the strongest. (It wasn’t.) And just one month later, Nikkei reported that the Japanese/French consortium had won.
• China’s Guangdong Nuclear Power Group had agreed to build the reactor using the Russian no-guarantee BOO model. Japan did not. The rapid awarding of the tender to the Japanese/French consortium suggests that China never had a real chance and was only used to secure more favorable terms from other potential suppliers.
• The real turning point was the entrance of GDF Suez, which agreed to operate the reactor. Mitsubishi indicated in August 2011 that it was not interested in operating the reactor.
• Turkey’s announcement that EUAS will take a 49% stake in the company is a key departure from previous Turkish policy, but Yildiz told reporters that “up to half of EUAS’ shares might be sold either through public offering or block sale.”
• Turkey is overselling itself. Ankara has had significant difficulties attracting long-term investment. Other public offerings have failed to attract significant interest and have been plagued by delays. There is no reason to believe that the nuclear offering will be any different.
• Where will the money come from? Turkey has plans to build a second canal, the world’s biggest airport, a new city along the new canal, and, hopefully, an Olympic complex. All of these projects require considerable financing. Where will the $4.5 billion in private financing come from? For that matter, where is the government getting all of this money?
• A note of caution – While I do think that the two sides will reconcile the outstanding issues, Canada’s AECL got to this stage in 1985, but the deal was cancelled after financial institutions refused to provide loans for the complicated financial scheme. This is certainly a possibility for the Sinop site.
• One question I keep asking myself is what will Turkey do with the spent fuel? Russia agreed to take back the spent fuel from Akkuyu. Both France and Japan have well established waste-management facilities, so I am assuming that one of them would take back the spent fuel once it has cooled for 3-10 years in an onsite spent fuel pond. However, the issue of take backs could be politically problematic in both countries. No voter likes the idea of nuclear waste. In turn, this raises questions about Turkey’s long-term waste storage policy. As of now, we don’t know the details, so we should refrain from speculating, but it is not outside the realm of possibility that Ankara could be asked to dispose of the spent fuel on its own.

I will be sure to update the blog as new information comes in. And, as always, tweet @aaronstein1 with comments, criticisms, or questions.

Stay tuned . . .

Explaining Turkish Nuclear Decision-Making: The Origins of Sinop

Last week, Turkey and Japan signed an agreement to begin exclusive negotiations for the construction of a nuclear power plant at the Sinop site on Turkey’s Black Sea coast. The agreement follows the 2010 agreement with Russia’s Rosatom for the construction of four VVER-1200 reactors at the Akkuyu site. I thought it would be useful to explain the origins of Turkey’s build-operate-own transfer policy using quotes from news stories at the time of its conception.

• “To make up the energy deficit the government is committed to initiating a $2,600 million nuclear power program. The commercial nuclear power station at Akkuyu is the first contract to be awarded . . . TEK [the Turkish Electricity Commission] hopes to build five more stations, with one at Sinop, ” according to Metin Demirsar in a 15 April 1982 report for Nucleonics Week.
  
• According to an 18 October 1984 report by Ann Taboroff for Nucleonics Week, “Industry sources said there was intense vexation in the firms at encountering new terms after 10 months of negotiations [Author's note: Taboroff is referring to the abrupt decision to move from a turnkey concept that envisioned Turkey providing 15% of the financing to a build-operate-transfer format, which called for 100% vendor financing.] But an advisor to Prime Minister Ozal called the offer ‘a sweet package’ for foreign investors. He said the energy sector in Turkey is ‘the most trustworthy area’ for investment, much less risky than opening a factory. Turkey’s proposal will reduce the government’s risk while increasing the foreign operator’s profitability, he said, adding that the government is willing to guarantee no nationalization will take place before the 15-year contract has expired.” [This is the first iteration of Turkey's no-guarantee build-operate-transfer policy, hence the reference to "no nationalization for 15 years."]
• From the same report – “Westinghouse, which submitted a proposal this summer in partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. of Japan, was also asked to consider the new financing idea although it never received a formal letter of intent. Officials say preference will be given to the Germans and Canadians, with Westinghouse as a ‘fall-back position.’ [Thus, Mitsubishi, which has subsequently bought Westinghouse, has a long history of working with Turkey; however, at the outset of the bidding process for Akkuyu, Turkey preferred Kraftwerk Union or AECL.]
• The following quote is the most critical for understanding Turkey’s nuclear decision-making. “The beauty of the new scheme is that the government will pay only if the reactor works,” said Yildirim Akturk, a director of the ENKA holding company and former head of the state planning organization. ENKA is working with AECL on the project. Akturk, a close associate of the prime minister [Turgut Ozal], explained the government is hesitant to commit itself to such a huge project without guarantees that it will really work in the end. In addition, the new plan allows Turkey to show the $2-billion cost as a trade transaction rather than as a debt. The new financing plan calls for the companies to provide an estimated $1-billion in interest charges during the eight-year construction period. Previously, the interest was covered by a Turkish government gurantee. . . Officials are envisioning a national network of up to a dozen nuclear stations. ” - Ann Taboroff, “Turkish Government Trying to Negotiate Akkuyu Financing by December,” Nucleonics Week, 18 October 1984. 
• “In addition, the sources say the question of counter-guarantees is proving to be a serious stumbling block in the negotiations. The vendors want counter-guarantees from the Treasury and the central bank, an idea the Turkish side is resisting, since they want the vendor to bear the bulk of the risk of the project,” according to another report by Ann Taboroff for Nucleonics Week on 21 March 1985.

The relationship between Turkey’s chronic current account deficit and BOT/BOO is crucial for understanding the development of Ankara’s approach to nuclear deal making. The government was – and is – focused on securing FDI. The BOT/BOO format allows for the transaction to recorded as such. If the supplier agrees to Turkey’s demands, the CAD is unaffected and Turkey’s FDI numbers go up. Thus, it is important to put Yildiz’s recent statement that EUAS will take a stake in the project in its proper context. While Ankara has been willing to discuss this type of arrangement in the past, the two sides could never agree to the financial terms, due in large part to foreign requests for financial guarantees.

Turkey, as evidenced by the quotes above, somehow thinks that it should not have to pay for the reactor technology until it is proven to work. Ankara, therefore, was keen for a return policy, even though the item they were buying was a nuclear reactor. Anyways, Ankara’s decision to partner with the Mitsubishi/GDF Suez is a way to finesse the guarantee issue and provide more certainty to the foreign bidders. The two sides, therefore, compromised. Japan bowed to Turkey’s unique financial demands and Ankara reciprocated by breaking precedent with its offer to take a stake in the project.  However, the deal could still face some problems surrounding the guaranteed price per-kWh.  The terms of the deal have not been released, thus only time will tell how it will play out.

As always, if you have comments, questions, or critiques tweet them @aaronstein1. 

Japan and Turkey Make it Official: The Start of Nuclear Negotiations

Prime Minister Erdogan is expected to announce tomorrow the selection of a Japanese/French nuclear consortium for the construction of a second nuclear power plant at the Sinop site on Turkey’s Black Sea coast. While the AKP appears to have been deliberately ambiguous in how it framed the roll-out, the announcement tomorrow will only grant Japan the exclusive right to begin negotiations for the actual power plant. The AKP, therefore, has finished one chapter, but the story’s ending has yet to be written. Please find my quick thoughts below:

1. Turkey finally made a concession! I never thought it would happen, but Taner Yildiz’s brief statement (which I am sure will not be covered widely) indicating that a Turkish state institution (EUAS) will take a stake in the project is a subtle change in Turkish nuclear policy. Ankara insists that the foreign supplier pay for the cost of construction, operate the reactor, and then recoup expenses from guaranteed electricity sales set at an artificially low rate over 15 years. The financing model is known as build-operate-own (BOO). Ankara, between 1983 and now, had steadfastly refused to provide financial guarantees for the cost of construction. Most major suppliers have accepted BOO, but have balked at Turkey’s refusal to provide guarantees. However, there is historical precedent for a foreign bidder offering to forgo a financial guarantee, if the Turkish government were to agree to partner with the contracting firm. Canada’s AECL, for example, made clear during its negotiations with Turkey during the 1980s that it would accept Turkish participation in the project as an indirect guarantee. The Turkish government refused and has maintained in subsequent negotiations that it will not take a stake in the project. Therefore, Yildiz’s statement represents a subtle shift in policy and signals a willingness to provide an indirect guarantee. If Ankara was really serious about partnering with a major-Western/Asian (non-Chinese) firm, it had to meet them half way and at least work to address their persistent worries about the lack of a guarantees. It appears as if Turkey has finally done just that.
2. This is not the Russian Akkuyu model.  Russia’s Rosatom will build the reactor without any guarantees or government participation in the project.
3. Despite the rush to conclude that this is a done deal, there continues to be a number of issues that could prevent progress. Russia and Turkey signed a similar arrangement in 2009, but were not able to conclude a deal for the building of reactors at Akkuyu until the two sides agreed to the guaranteed price per-kWh in 2010. Russia had initially asked for $22.5 cents, but Turkey balked at the price, arguing that it was too high. Ankara came back and demanded that Russia sell the electricity for $12.35 cents. Russia eventually signed off on the Turkish request, but in doing so, Rosatom agreed to extend the pay back period. In turn, this has increased their risk because – wait for it – they don’t have a guarantee.
4. China was a patsy and used to encourage the major suppliers to offer better terms. Even though Beijing had agreed to the Russian financing model, Turkey was never likely to choose China because it cannot export its latest Western-owned reactor designs.
5. Justin Bieber screwed this up! At this point, most Turks probably know more about Bieber’s skipping of customs at Ataturk airport than tomorrow’s announcement. The AKP, by all accounts, wanted to make a splash with this announcement. However, the news has been transfixed by Bieber’s concert in Istanbul. The buzz is likely to continue tomorrow and the post-concert media frenzy risks diverting some of the media’s attention away from the announcement.

Musings on Turkey’s Impending Nuclear Decision

Reuters is reporting that Turkey will make a decision about its second nuclear power plant by this weekend. The Japanese/French consortium is rumored to be the front runner and Turkish media is reporting that Prime Minister Erdogan and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will sign the agreement during their bilateral meeting this weekend. Below are my intial thoughts on the rumored deal:

1. The French/Japanese consortium will reportedly build Areva’s Atmea 1100 MW pressurized water reactor. The reactor is an evolutionary design and has not been built before. If the reports are true, this will be the second time that Turkey will have accepted serving as the test-bed for an evolutionary reactor design. Russia’s Rosatom, for example, will build the VVER-1200 at the Akkuyu site. The reactor is an evolutionary design of the current VVER-1000 model.
2. In the run up to the reported announcement, the Turkish press has reported that France’s recent softening of its resistance to Turkey’s EU process has opened the doors to nuclear cooperation. This narrative is political spin and has very little basis in reality. If the Japan/France consortium is selected, it will be because the two suppliers opted to build the reactors without receiving a Turkish financial guarantee – plain and simple. The EU, I am sorry to say, has nothing to do with it. The only link between Turkey’s EU bid and the nuclear file is that Turkey indicated during its negotiations with foreign bidders that the reactor must meet EU or US safety standards.
3. The deal would vindicate Ankara’s peculiar financial demands. Turkey, since 1983, has demanded that the foreign bidder pay for the cost of reactor construction and recoup expenses from artificially low guaranteed electricity sales over 15-20 years. Moreover, the government has refused to provide a financial guarantee or partner with the foreign firm. This approach has prevented progress with ever major Western/Asian (non-Chinese) nuclear firm. Nevertheless, Turkey stubbornly pursued its preferred financing model. Its tenacity may have paid off. Turkey’s financial format will allow for the AKP to classify the reactor deal as FDI, so expect a corresponding $20 billion bump in Turkey’s FDI stats once constructions begins.
4. The reactor will not be completed on time. Turkey and Russia, for example, had initially agreed that construction at Akkuyu would begin in 2014. However, it is 2015, and TAEK (Turkey’s nuclear regulatory authority) just cancelled its latest tender for a foreign firm to review the design documents. Rosatom still has not received a construction license. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the government will meet its nuclear goals for the 2023 centennial.
5. IRAN HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH TURKEY’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. Advocates of the nuclear domino theory love to claim that Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are destined to pursue a nuclear weapons program, if Iran were to decide to break out and weaponize its stockpiles of low-enriched uranium. As evidence for Turkey’s nuclear intent, nuclear domino theorists point to Turkey’s 2008 nuclear tender (which largely coincided with the breakdown of the Iran-EU3 negotiations) as evidence. These assertions have no basis in reality. Turkey has been pursuing nuclear energy since 1955. Moreover, after changing domestic legislation in 1983, Ankara has refused to alter its tender terms, even though its financial demands have prevented Turkey from meetings its ambitious nuclear goals. Its current approach to nuclear energy, is reflective of its historic pre-2002 approach to nuclear energy. Moreover, this shallow analysis fails to account for the steps Turkey has taken to defend against a potential nuclear armed Iran.
6. Turkey, if it concludes an agreement with Japan/France, will, in the next twenty years, have eight foreign owned and operated reactors on its territory. Turkey is the first country to have concluded a build-operate-own arrangement for nuclear energy. The unique arrangement has raised some unanswered questions about liability in the case of an accident.

Stay tuned for more information and, as always, tweet @aaronstein1 with comments, questions, or criticisms.

Guest Post: Erdogan’s Visit to Gaza: A Perspective from Jerusalem

As part of a larger effort to expand the views on Turkey Wonk, I am handing the creative reigns over to Gabriel Mitchell – an Israel Research Fellow at Shalem College in Jerusalem – for his thoughts on Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s proposed visit to Gaza. He can be followed on Twitter at @GabiMitch.

Without further ado . . .

It has only been a month since Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apology to his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and yet it feels like there is nothing left to say on the issue.  Every analyst – from expert to novice – has contributed their two cents into the ever-growing world of punditry.  If there was ever an international discord that could be likened to reality television, with its growing fandom and constant talkbacks, this would be it.  There is nothing more entertaining than watching friends fight.

Yet for the many Israelis, “friendship” is a term that no longer applies to Turkey.  Ever since Erdoğan’s 2009 outburst in Davos, and the subsequent Gaza flotilla nightmare, the public regards Turkey as former friend turned foe.  It is as if Israel’s regional Anakin Skywalker became Darth Vader overnight.

And the face of that Darth Vader is Erdoğan.  The Israeli media took every opportunity to cast Turkey as yet another Middle Eastern country fallen under the spell of radical Islam, and as their familiarity with Erdoğan and his rhetoric deepened, this image gradually worsened; Turkey was no longer a victim but a catalyst for the expansion of Islamist rule in Tunisia, and subsequently Egypt.  Erdoğan’s insistence to visit the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip in May (in time for the 3^rd anniversary of the Gaza flotilla) has only reinforced this image.

Historically, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been a sticking point for Turkey, and over the decades there have been numerous peaks and valleys.  The passing of the 1980 Jerusalem Law and the First and Second Intifadas were all moments of tension between the two Middle Eastern democracies.  Erdoğan’s continuous slander against the Jewish State – often in an effort to curry favor within his domestic audience – has, however, undermined Turkey’s ability to function as an unbiased role player within the conflict.

Erdoğan’s visit to the Gaza Strip would not only serve to undermine Israeli and American efforts to isolate Hamas – a terrorist organization that calls for Israel’s destruction – but would also likely undermine moderate Palestinian president Abu Mazen.  Though his authority has long been in decline (last week reform-friendly Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigned), he is the sole legitimate representative of a (future – and in the eyes of Turkey, current) Palestinian state in the eyes of the international community.   In the short term the visit will also have a negative impact on negotiations with Israel, and undoubtedly, turn the majority of Israelis against future cooperation and engagement with Turkey.

More importantly, Erdoğan’s visit is going to have a negative impact on Turkey itself.  The gains of being televised arm in arm with Hamas are not going to outweigh the damaging impact it will have among Western audiences tired with his displays of chauvinist demagoguery.

Turkey under the Erdoğan and the AKP has become a champion of Palestinian rights on the world stage.  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s speech prior to the United Nations General Assembly vote on Palestinian statehood, an Abu Mazen achievement, went so far as to refer to Palestine as “a bleeding wound in the conscience of all humanity.” And yet despite this, it is Gaza City and not Ramallah that Erdoğan so desperately wants to see.  If he is so invested in the successful development of the fledgling state, perhaps a visit to both political bodies would serve everyone’s interests (I am not even going to suggest a visit to Jerusalem which is equally necessary).

Interestingly, Bibi Netanyahu has remained largely silent on the upcoming visit.  This can be interpreted in three ways: 1) that Netanyahu recognizes that his silence will be rewarded by a completion of reconciliation talks, 2) he is waiting for Obama to convince Erdoğan to back down (which he has in the past), or 3) that the Turkish premier’s visit to Gaza indirectly serves Netanyahu’s desire to keep Fatah and Hamas at odds.  Though it is possibly a combination of the three and Netanyahu has always displayed a profound levelheadedness regarding his more temperamental Turkish counterpart’s actions, the biggest statement his silence infers is that the Gaza blockade, one of Turkey’s three demands in return for reconciliation, can no longer be legally defined as such.

It is far more likely that Erdoğan’s Gaza visit, much like his gestures towards Ocalan and the PKK, has far more to do with securing his presidential bid in 2014 than the future of peace in the region.  Time and again he has proven to employ the illusion of soft power to garner domestic power.  This does not appear to be any different.  For Erdoğan to turn the corner in his political career he must find a way to exude balance and not asymmetry – selflessness over narcissism.  The tantalizing distraction of being the guest of honor in Gaza should not be placed above the greater rewards of Palestinian reconciliation, Israeli-Turkish reconciliation, and certainly the hopes of renewing talks between Israel and the Palestinians.

As always, if you have comments, questions, or criticisms tweet @GabiMitch.

*The views are the author’s alone.

Musings on AKP Decision-Making and Israel’s Apology

Apologies for my prolonged absence. I have been in Washington and Los Angeles these past two weeks and have been busy with other projects, including a serious re-dedication to sampling different wines from different regions in California. (A luxury I cannot afford in Istanbul – Turley’s Zinfandel was the best, by the way.)

In the early days of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal is known to have gathered his cabal of advisors around a large table, drink copious amounts of Raki, smoke a lot of cigarettes, and debate policy decisions. Turkey’s centralized system, while not democratic, did allow for Mustafa Kemal to make sweeping and radical decision quickly. Turkey’s penchant for centralized decision-making did not end after the decision to move to multi-party elections.

The AKP’s sustained efforts to centralize power, therefore, is not out of the main stream of Turkish politics. Sadly, they are but one in a lineage of successive governments who have sought to maximize political power by taking advantage of Turkey’s weak governmental institutions. Thus, I found myself in complete agreement with Steven Cook, when he wrote that “A decade after assuming power, Prime Minister Erdogan is the sun around which Turkish politics revolves—a fact he both knows and seems to relish. He seldom seems to wrestle with a decision, enjoys swatting away questions from observers who clearly ‘do not pay close enough attention,’ and brooks no criticism from an opposition that he does not take seriously.”

The AKP’s political dominance has also had a tangible impact on governmental transparency. For example, I recently asked an AKP insider how Erdogan and his advisors make policy-decisions. The person, despite proclaiming to know a great deal about how the Party works, told me that he had no idea. This lack of insight into AKP decision-making is pervasive in Turkey. The dominant belief, which I share, is that the AKP’s upper echelon, along with their pollsters, gather in the Prime Ministry and chart out the  country’s legislative agenda. The group is tight, does not leak information to the press, and makes it decisions behind closed-doors. The marching orders are then filtered through out the Party and then released in bits and pieces in television interviews and well placed leaks. It appears – again nothing is for certain – that the AKP then takes stock of the public reaction and then modifies or changes its talking points. The underlying policy, however, rarely changes. This pattern, however, does allow the AKP to distract the voters when a policy is a bit too controversial. Erdogan, therefore, is known to raise, from time-to-time, divisive wedge issues for public debate when he deems it to be politically prudent.

Erdogan tends to use his speech to Parliament on Tuesday to set the week’s political agenda. Thus, us AKP outsiders can get a sense of the Party’s priorities from the issues discussed during the speech. For example, Erdogan has recently devoted substantial time to the Kurdish peace process and the efforts to re-write the constitution. The two issues are, far and away, the government’s top political priorities.

Erdogan has, however, totally ignored the Israeli apology. Erdogan’s silence is good news. The AKP had, since the Mavi Marmara raid, used Israel to garner populist support from certain segments of Turkey’s voters. Turkey, even during the late 1990s and 2000s, always kept its ties to the Jewish state quiet. Hugh Pope eloquently made clear in an interview that:

Israel would do well to remember that Turkish policy toward it is not indexed to either U.S. pressure or any Turkish leader’s personal leanings. Rather, the main factor is Turkish public opinion of whether Israel is ready to make peace with the Palestinians. Successive Turkish governments took exception to the six-day war of 1967, the 1973 war, the 1980 declaration of Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital, and the 2002 attacks on West Bank cities. It was only after Israel engaged in the Middle East peace process in the early 1990s that Turkey sent its first ambassador to Israel; and it was only after Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 that Erdoğan first visited the Jewish state.

The narrative that paints a picture of a close Israeli-Turkish political alliance simply does not jibe with reality or the history. Israel should, therefore, prepare for an icy relationship with Turkey in the future. The prospects for peace with Palestinians are dismal and Likud’s policies are antithetical to Turkey’s policies. Israel, however, is not a central issue for the vast majority of Turkish voters. Erdogan, therefore, has an incredible degree of flexibility in how he chooses to frame Turkey’s relationship with the Jewish state. Erdogan’s approach, since the apology, has actually been to ignore Turkey’s relationship with Israel. He has, as I mentioned earlier, devoted almost all of his time to talking about the PKK peace process and the proposed Constitutional changes.

Thus, Israelis, who seem to hang on every word uttered by Turkish politicians, should rest a little easier tonight. The most important Turkish citizen, Erdogan, is largely ignoring you. Erdogan has, however, stuck to his pledge to visit Gaza. The incessant focus on the trip, however, has overshadowed a subtle shift in the AKP’s framing of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The AKP, which has sought to cultivate ties with Hamas, has been keen to re-invigorate ties with Abu Mazen’s Fatah. The internal narrative has, therefore, shifted from championing an anti-Israel message, to one that focuses on Palestinian reconciliation. The subtle change is also indicative of Turkey’s coming to grips with the fact that it has little, if any, real influence over Hamas.

Turkey’s Israel/Palestine policy has, therefore, changed in a number of important ways since the apology. However, the AKP’s opaque decision making structure has deflected most from full appreciating the shift. According to Murat Yetkin’s reporting, the main thrust of the current policy is to support the Egyptian led effort to promote Palestinian reconciliation because ”If any agreement between Abbas and Mashaal is secured, if Mashaal will agree to host Abbas with Erdoğan, then the three of them might get into the territory from Refah gate with Egypt, without stepping onto Israeli soil. That could be a game-changer move by Erdoğan, and if he also secures the ‘right to exist’ of Israel from the Hamas leader, that would please not only the U.S. administration but many others from Russia to the European Union.”

Turkey is, therefore, working to re-establish itself as a player in the Middle East peace process. This strategy necessitates that Ankara have a relationship with Israel. Thus, Turkey watchers should expect Ankara to remain committed to normalizing its relationship with the Jewish state. The relationship, however, will continue to be icy. Moreover, the fruits of the apology will likely be confined to quite cooperation on the Syrian threat. The AKP will, without a doubt, continue to pretend that they are not cooperating with Israel about Syria. In reality, the two sides are rumored to be cooperating extensively, in order to ensure a desirable post-Assad outcome. Hence, the two sides are likely to rapidly conclude their current talks about compensation and try to move on. Afterwards, look for Turkey to very quietly drop its objections to Israeli participation in NATO exercises. The process will is likely to take place over months, consist of numerous steps, and not be widely talked about in glowing terms by the Turkish government.

To quote Ahmet Davutoglu, “this is normal, natural even.”

Stay tuned . .

As always, if you comments or criticisms tweet them @aaronstein1